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THE RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY ABOUT OVER-COMING THE
CULT OF INDIVIDUAL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

[redacted] the resolution of July 3 of this 50X1-HUM
[redacted] year is the turning point in the development of the thaw
events about which it was said long ago that it must come
but the coming of which was expected rather later. It is
the point of stabilization of the thaw. That is, the point
which constitutes a sort of turning point. Namely, all that
has up till now been achieved within the framework of the
thaw will probably not be reversed, but the further develop-
ment of criticism will be stopped and stabilization of the
thaw on the positions that have been achieved will take place.

[redacted] the speeding up of the stabiliza- 50X1-HUM
tion decision by Moscow was probably caused by the publica-
tion of the Khrushchev speech. As a result of the publica-
tion of that speech, certain phenomena disadvantageous for
Moscow took place earlier than was expected by the Russian
Politbureau. [redacted] that the resolution 50X1-HUM
about the "overcoming of the cult of individual and its
consequences" is the stabilization resolution which was
generally expected.

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However, this resolution creates a very interesting situation in Poland. It is easy to announce the stabilization of the thaw in Russia because there the problem of party opinion and public opinion does not play a major part. However, stabilization of the thaw in Poland does not yet have a prepared ground despite the animated activities of the opponents of the thaw. For this reason, on the one hand, there arises a disproportion between the intentions of Moscow and the intentions of the Polish leadership even if the whole of that leadership wanted stabilization of the thaw, and on the other hand, which

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is particularly important, the moment has come when the thaw groups in the Polish party will have to fight for the further development of the thaw contrary to the intentions and instructions of the Soviet Politbureau. Up till now the direction of the thaw pressure in Poland and the direction of the development of events in Russia were the same, although there was no equal pace of both those movements. Hence there arises a qualitative disproportion between the thaw in Poland and the thaw in Russia. At present, the difference and disproportion will arise not only in the pace but also in the direction. And for this reason the present period will be more serious and difficult for the Polish Communist party than the period after the publication of the speech of Khrushchev. The speech of Khrushchev, des-

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the cult of individual and its consequences" is both hypocritical and anti-thaw.

2. [redacted] the line which underlines the whole resolution has its bankrupt history in Poland. In reality, it is the line of the theory of so-called stages. The theory which was used by the opponents of the thaw in Poland in defending Radkiewicz and the Security Police and in defending Stalin and his crimes.

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But the main anti-thaw manifestation of the resolution is the attempt to hide the objective causes which made Stalinism possible. The question which has been raised by the activists of the Polish party is: "What was wrong in the system, why did it lead to such crimes like e.g. those which were described by Khrushchev." Clearly, an answer to this question must show the objective foundations which made it possible for the transformation of the Communist system into Stalinism. The resolution of July 3 gives certain objective reasons which led to the appearance of the so-called "cult of the individual", but it does not answer the fundamental question as to what was wrong in the system. On the contrary, it brings forward the thesis that the Communist system is unique and perfect, that it is not necessary to make any changes in that system.

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All the objective causes given in the resolution have an external character, not connected with the system. In connection with this [redacted] it is necessary constantly to ask the fundamental question, perhaps in a slightly modified form. Namely, in what way the objective conditions of the system could, with the existence of certain external factors, lead to the crimes of Stalinism?

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The thesis that the cause of Stalinism were external conditions not connected with the Communist system was - [redacted] - criticised among the Polish party activists already in the beginning of 1955. This is because that thesis, if it does not justify Stalin himself, brings down his crimes to the order of errors and mistakes. It justifies the absence of struggle against Stalinism and it does not close the road for the repetition of the crimes of the Stalinist period.

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[redacted] prof. Niechukina brought forward a similar thesis in 1955 during a meeting of the Ideological Active at the Central Committee and was simply ridiculed for making such a thesis. It follows from this that tendencies to analyse Stalinism only in the light of external factors existed already long ago among the opponents of the thaw in the Soviet Union and in Poland.

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must place a special stress on the possibility of the repetition of individual dictatorship in the Soviet Union, if the analysis of the Soviet Politbureau is accepted as right. If Stalin's dictatorship was created as a result of external factors, and especially the capitalist environment, the sharpening international situation, the appearance of Fascism and finally the war - nobody can guarantee that in the course of the development of world revolution and with the sharpening of the struggle against capitalism this kind of external factors will not repeat themselves. And then, with unchanged objective conditions of the Communist system a new period of Stalinism must come.

3. Defining all phenomena taking place in social life, Marxism, as is well known, differentiates between two groups of factors which decide about these phenomena and which explain what is their course. The first group are objective factors, i.e. independent of party policy, the will of the Politbureau, the needs of the people. The second group are subjective factors, i.e. the policy of the party, the ability of the party to implement the postulates of that policy, the character of the prominent individual which plays the leading part in the movement. In explaining the causes of the emergence of the cult of the individual, the resolution of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party not only does not acknowledge the fundamental

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evils and deviations of the Communist system which made the appearance of the cult of individual possible, i.e. it does not acknowledge the fundamental objective factor, and it simultaneously does not acknowledge the fundamental subjective factor.

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Where does this lead to? [] assume that the reso-
lution is right in maintaining that the objective causes of Stalinism had exclusively an external character. And that there are no objective causes inherent in the Communist system which would lead to the cult of individual. But then there still remains the problem of the internal subjective factor.

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The resolution gives only one subjective internal factor which led to the cult of the individual. We read in the resolution:

"In considering this matter /now in the conditions of the Soviet socialist system the cult of the individual could emerge/ it is necessary to keep in mind both the definite objective historical conditions in which the socialist development of the Soviet Union took place and certain subjective factors connected with the personal characteristics of Stalin."

Thus, as the subjective factor the resolution enumerates only that factor which in the Marxist hierarchy of subjective factors takes one of the last places.

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[] at this point it is possible to quote Plechanov, recently

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restated the importance, using his book "On the role of the individual in history."

In this respect the resolution is a clear withdrawal in comparison with the previous views of the Leadership of the Russian Party which clearly admitted that in the period of Stalinism essential errors in party policy were committed. /A subjective factor having a much higher place in the hierarchy/. [redacted] it is

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necessary constantly to point out to the inconsistency and contrast between the previous statements and the present resolution. It is necessary to consider what is the source of these inconsistencies. [redacted] that source is clear. If responsibility for the emergence of Stalinism is borne also by other subjective factors /party policy, ability of the party to implement the postulates of that policy, party leadership/ then the thesis about the Leninist nucleus of the party which existed and acted in Stalin's times falls through. At the same time, the present party leadership, as co-responsible for these subjective factors, cannot avoid co-responsibility for Stalin's crimes.

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4. The authors of the resolution realize that it follows clearly from the analysis executed in the resolution that the errors of Stalinism may repeat themselves in the future. And for this reason they try to show in the resolution that with the unchanged objective conditions of the Soviet [redacted]

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there at present exist guarantees which prevent the repetitions of the errors of Stalinism. These guarantees are as follows:

a/ The fact that the leadership of the Soviet party itself started and conducts the criticism of the errors of the Stalinism era. According to the resolution, this fact is a proof of the good will of the leadership and a guarantee that the errors of Stalinism will not be repeated. In other words, among the Soviet leaders there are no subjective conditions, no personal characteristics, which might lead to dictatorship a la Stalin. In these conditions even if the objective external conditions, as a result of the development of world revolution and the struggle against capitalism repeat themselves, there are no subjective conditions for the appearance of a dictatorship of the individual.

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[redacted] this is a weak point of the resolution. First of all, the content of the party leadership may easily change and then the subjective conditions will change. Besides, that content does not have to change, The character of Stalin also changed and only later, after that change, appeared the subjective personal conditions which led to Stalin's dictatorship.

Secondly, the fact that criticism alone is no guarantee. Criticism is not equal criticism. Criticism safeguards

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against the repetition of the evil only when it discloses the actual and true causes of that evil and when it removes those causes. Criticism alone is neither a proof of good will nor a guarantee of the thing not being repeated. if the roots of the evil are not removed.

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at this point it is necessary to bring forward the following thesis. For an average party activist the period in which the fact of criticism of Stalin alone was admirable for him, already belongs to the past. At present it is a matter of that criticism to be sincere and to bring changes and results.

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t the basis for a discussion on this point should be the article of Szaf in the April issue of the NOWE DROGI. In that article Szaf raises the question what were the causes of the crime of Stalinism and states that this is a problem for analysis and that at this time he cannot answer this question. Szaf's article goes much further than the resolution "On the over-coming of the cult of individual and its consequences" and it is possible to find in that article many proofs of inconsistency with the present resolution.

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b/ The second guarantee brought forward by the resolution is the fact that the rule over the Russian Party has now been taken over by the so-called "Leninist nucleus" in the party.

much space

should be devoted to the problem of that

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Leninist nucleus. The thesis about the Leninist nucleus in the party, the nucleus which worked in Stalin's times and which counter-acted and slowed down the negative results of Stalin's dictatorship, appears for the first time in that resolution in a clearly formulated way. The resolution states:

"The Twentieth Party Congress and the whole policy of the Central Committee after Stalin's death testify clearly that inside the Central Committee of the party there existed a Leninist nucleus of leaders who understood properly the acute needs both in domestic and in foreign policy. It cannot be said that there was no counter-action to these negative phenomena which were connected with the cult of the individual and slowed down the forward progress of socialism. What is more, there were certain periods, e.g. in the war years, when the one-person activity of Stalin was definitely limited, when there weakened in an essential way the negative results of lawlessness, caprices etc."

The objective of the thesis about the Leninist nucleus of leaders is clear. What was wrong in Stalin's time is the fault of Stalin and the cult of the individual. What was good, and especially the victory over the Germans, is the achievement of the Leninist nucleus of leaders. This Leninist nucleus of leaders has now taken over the rule of

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the party and this is the guarantee that the crimes of Stalinism will not repeat themselves.

[redacted] this thesis should very sharply 50X1-HUM
be opposed. Firstly, it is necessary to say what was that Leninist nucleus, if it existed at all. This Leninist nucleus consisted of those leaders who opposed the Stalinist line. As is well known, they were shot, exterminated or completely removed from influence. With this it is necessary to point out that those who were removed from influence were not re-admitted to participate in party leadership /even if they survived Stalinism/ after Stalin's death.

Secondly, the names of the Politbureau elected at the Twentieth Congress are the same names which figured in the wider circle of the members of the Presidium at the Nineteenth Stalinist Congress. They are men who were the closest collaborators of Stalin. In what way, it should be asked, if the majority in the Politbureau was held by the Leninist nucleus 50X1-HUM of leaders, if that Leninist nucleus occupied almost all /except Beria/ most important party position, state and economic, - in what way could the personal dictatorship of Stalin take place? If the Leninist nucleus does not consist of the closest collaborators of Stalin, then of whom does it consist? It is possible to ask here with irony whether that Leninist nucleus consisted of marshal Zhukov and comrade Puroeva - the only Politbureau members added at the

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Twentieth Congress. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] it is necessary to ask the question: if the present leaders, i.e. Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Molotov, Malenkov and Voroshilov are to be considered the Leninist nucleus which in Stalin's times set right the errors and maintained the proper party line, then in what way did that Leninist nucleus work? Did they organize in Stalin's lifetime an illegal, fractional Central Committee which met regularly? Because as concerns the official Central Committee, it almost never met. And how can a party nucleus of leaders exist if it never meets and does not constitute an organized group? The resolution says, for example, that during the war the Leninist nucleus of leaders limited the power of Stalin. And Khrushchev stated in his speech that during the war not a single Central Committee plenum took place.

It is also necessary to ask where was that Leninist nucleus when the cult of Stalin started to spread? In what did that fight of the Leninist nucleus in the party against the cult of individual manifest itself?

In accordance with the Marxist view such phenomena like individual dictatorship, in this case the dictatorship of Stalin, are social and not psychological phenomena. Hence a simple conclusion that there had to exist some social or political forces which supported Stalin. Such a force, according to the resolution "On the over-coming of the cult

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of individual and its consequences" were the people who loved Stalin. But after all, the people did not start loving Stalin immediately. And Stalin alone could not win that love. Somebody must have helped him in this. Somebody must have built that cult of individual.

An answer to the question who did that is given by a book published in 1929, on the 50tieth birthday of Stalin. In that book some members of the present Politbureau - among them candidates for the so-called Leninist nucleus - in a vulgar way even in the light of the present Soviet statements, falsified history building the cult of Stalin. And in 1929 the "Leninist nucleus" of the party did not work under terror or under the pressure of the masses. In the above mentioned book Voroshilov published an article on several dozen pages entitled "Stalin and the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union" which in its theses does not differ in any way from the now criticized "Short Biography" and "Short Course of Party History". Apart from that the book, [redacted] contains similarly falsified articles of Molotov, Kagonovich and Mikoyan.

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It is being said that Stalin himself wrote the "Short Biography" and with his own hand included the praises of himself. It is being said that Stalin wrote the "Short Course" and with his own hand entered the praises of himself.

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But the "Short Course" was published in 1938 and the "Short Biography" after the Second World War. In the meantime Stalin, similarly to the present-day "Leninist nucleus of the party", opposed excessive stressing of the role of individual not less strongly than it is done at present by Khrushchev and company. /For example Stalin's letter to col. R. [redacted] protesting 50X1-HUM
[redacted] against idolatrous praising of Stalin by that colonel./

Thus, on the one hand, the present "Leninist nucleus of the party" started building the cult of Stalin still in 1929, and on the other hand, the condemnation of the cult of individual is no proof that he who condemns it does not aim at dictatorship. 50X1-HUM

5. The thesis that it was not possible to fight Stalin because the people stood behind him deserves [redacted] a wider attention. It is the Marxist thesis, brought to an absurd, that the people are the creators of history. 50X1-HUM
This thesis can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, as it is interpreted by the majority of party activists, i.e.: "More freedom for the party - more initiative for the people". Secondly, as it is interpreted by the Soviet Leadership: "the whole power for the Politbureau, the whole responsibility for errors of the past for the people".

Irrespectively of this there immediately arises the question: if the nation is responsible for Stalin in the

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sense that it supported Stalin and made his over-throw impossible, the logical conclusion is that the Russian leaders only in some cases listen to the will of the people and obey it. The people supported Stalin and therefore Khrushchev and the comrades did not want, in those conditions, to act against Stalin. But after all, the day after Stalin's death the feelings of the people for the dead dictator did not change. And still, as the resolution clearly states, the day after Stalin's death the Russian leaders started to liquidate the cult of the individual, acted against Stalinism and therefore went against the nation. Thus the real reason why the "Leninist nucleus in the party" did not act against Stalin in Stalin's life-time was not the love of the people for Stalin. The only objective factor which changed with Stalin's death was the departure of the dictator to whom the "Leninist nucleus of the party bowed. There was no change in the feelings of the people. Thus, the motive of action of the "Leninist nucleus" was not the will of the people but fear for its own skin.

The resolution contains another logical inconsistency. If it is said that the people supported Stalin, how can it be possible to speak simultaneously that since the first moment after Stalin's death the people with great enthusiasm supported all moves against Stalinism?

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points out the double standard accepted with regard to the Russian nation and the German nation by the Russian leaders. About Nazism it was said that the nation is responsible because it supported Hitler. But that the main fault is borne by the generals and the leaders of the NSDAP party, i.e. those who were in the leadership of the Nazi dictatorship and helped Hitler. As is well known, in Nuremberg prosecutor Rudenko rejected the thesis of the defense that the party leaders and generals had to obey the orders of the dictator /Hitler/ in fear for their own skin. However, the Russian party leaders and generals defend themselves by saying that they had to obey the orders of the dictator /Stalin/ in fear for their own skin. The accused in the Nuremberg trial did not try to bring forward the argument which is brought forward by the Russian Central Committee, that they were opposed to Hitler but could not fight against him because the nation supported him /which incidentally was more true than in the case of Russia./

After the liquidation of Hitler's dictatorship the German nation was almost completely cleared of responsibility. On the other hand, the German generals, leaders of the NSDAP party and the closest collaborators of Hitler were shot, imprisoned and in the great majority of cases ousted from public life. If some of them continues to take part in the public life of West Germany, this fact causes indignation of the official Russian and Polish circles /which is

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quite right./

There is a different standard with respect to Russia. The resolution says: "the people are guilty, and those who were closest to Stalin, his closest collaborators and party leaders, are innocent." And apart from Beria, the whole leading group remained in power as in Stalin's times.

This wholly resembles the situation which was once described by the Communist writer Theodore Pli⁴ver in the book "The Emperor Departed, the Generals Remained". After the first world war the German empire was abolished and emperor Wilhelm abdicated. The Weimar Republic was created. But in view of the fact that only the emperor departed and his generals and closest collaborators remained, it was possible for Nazism to be created in Germany. Such is the Marxist analysis of one of the main causes of dictatorship in Germany. Such a thesis was brought forward, among others, by the resolution of the VI Congress of the Comintern.

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[redacted] it is necessary to bring forward the thesis that as long as after the departure of the emperor /Stalin/ his closest collaborators remain in power, there exist objective conditions for the transformation of the Weimar Republic /thaw Russia/ into the Nazi dictatorship /Russia of dictatorship of the individual./

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6. In the resolution "On the over-coming of the cult of individual and its consequences" there is one extremely important formulation which was absent from Khrushchev's speech and which is of particular importance for Poland. The formulation concerns the thesis of Stalin: "The class struggle sharpens with the development of the building of socialism." This thesis, as is well known, was condemned by Khrushchev in his speech at the Twentieth Congress. At that time Khrushchev stated, that this thesis was a theoretical justification of the abuse of power and mass breaking of the rule of law by Stalin.

The formulation which we find in the resolution of July 3 is slightly different:

"A great harm to the cause of building of socialism and the development of democracy in the party and the state was rendered by the mistaken thesis of Stalin that with the progress of the Soviet Union on the road to socialism, the class struggle will allegedly become sharper. This thesis, right only for definite stages of the transitional period....when the sharp class struggle was going on for the building of the foundations of socialism, was brought to the foreground in 1937, at the time when socialism won in our country."

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Thus, the resolution states that it was an error to extend the thesis about the intensification of class struggle with the building of the foundations of socialism to the period when socialism in the Soviet Union was already built. In other words, the resolution states that Stalin's thesis is right in the conditions of the transitional period, in conditions of Poland and other satellite countries. And it is wrong only in the case of Russia, in conditions of a socialist state and not a state building socialism.

After the Twentieth Congress, in the Polish press and in statements of Communist leaders in Poland Stalin's thesis about sharpening of the class struggle was considered as erroneous also with regard to Poland. This was the theoretical foundation for the explanation of several mistakes committed in Poland in the period of limiting democracy.

Thus, the resolution of July 3 places the Polish party in a very difficult situation. The party must state whether the thesis about the rightness of sharpening the class struggle in Poland in the period of building socialism is at present in force or not. There were still no such statements after the publication of the resolution of July 3rd. However, attention is directed to the fact that in the platform, though very short, article which was published in the TRYBUNA LUDU of July 11 on the resolution of the Central Committee

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of the Soviet Communist Party, entitled "A document of great importance" the thesis of sharpening the class struggle is repeated literally in the formulation of the Russian resolution. [redacted]

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sidering that the article is short and many important matters of the resolution were not discussed in it, it may mean a withdrawal from the stand considering the error of the Stalin thesis with regard to Poland to the stand recognizing the rightness of Stalin's thesis with regard to Poland.

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[redacted]
passage of the resolution should first of all show the inconsistency of that which was said by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress with that which is said by the resolution. Next, [redacted] the withdrawal of the Russian party on this fundamental matter which for Russia may not be of major importance but which for Poland and the other satellite countries is most valid. The acceptance of the thesis about the rightness of Stalin's theory in the transitional period in Poland and other countries may become a theoretical basis for intensification of persecutions and for increasing the so-called "class vigilance", well known already from previous periods. Thus, it is necessary to ask straight the party leadership in Poland to say if it recognizes the rightness of Stalin's thesis with regard to Poland.

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Apart from that [redacted] it should be 50X1-HUM
necessary to bring forward the thesis that the new stand
of the Central Committee of the Russian party is a warning
for the Communist parties in the satellite countries that
they should not go further in thaw moves than does Russia
where, after all, the situation is much easier because the
class struggle does not sharpen any more there. It is also
necessary to develop the thesis that this new formulation
about the intensification of class struggle in the transitional
period may be a foretaste of those tragic tests which await
the nation in the period of mass collectivization which, in
accordance with the Communist theory, constitutes the end
of the transitional period. The new formulation of the thesis
about the sharpening of class struggle in the transitional
period may be a theoretical motivation of the necessity for
mass terror in the period of collectivization. Hence, among
other things, this new formulation so exceedingly important
for Poland.

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7. [redacted] points out that the article in TRYBUNA LUDU concerning the resolution of July 3rd appeared on July 11, i.e. eight days after the publication of that resolution in the Polish press. This is an unheard-of case in the party practice of the Polish press. Resolutions of such great importance were always discussed in editorial articles the next day at the latest. Such an article commented on the resolution and gave indications to the party to what should attention be directed in the resolution.

The cause of this eight day delay could be differences in the Politbureau itself, differences in the evaluation of the content and line of the resolution. These differences required the delay necessary for discussions and the achievement of a more or less uniform view. Possibly the cause of the delay was the wish on the part of the Party Leadership to learn the stand of other Communist parties. Or finally, which is least probable, the absorption with internal events in Poland. [redacted] this eight day delay

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is a proof that the evaluation of the resolution of July 3 was not uniform either in the Party Leadership or among the party activists.

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[redacted] one fact is most striking. The article in the TRYBUNA LUDU does not mention and does not follow up the evaluation of certain events in Poland, and especially the evaluation of the events in Poznan, contained

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in the resolution of the Central Committee of the Russian party. This is a fact never before encountered. The practice up till now consisted in the fact that in commenting a resolution of the Russian party the foreign Communist press, and especially the press of a satellite country, took as the starting point for a commentary first of all the domestic affairs of its own country, if the resolution mentioned them. The TRYBUNA LUDU article does not mention in a single word the evaluation of the Poznan events contained in the resolution of July 3rd, there is not a word that the Russian resolution speaks about Poznan at all.

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this is a proof that the leadership of the Polish party cannot agree with the Russian evaluation of the Poznan events. It cannot agree with making the so-called imperialist agents completely responsible for Poznan. This does not mean that there is a conflict between the leadership of the Polish party and the leadership of the Russian party. Possibly, the difference in evaluations took place with a secret consent of the Soviet Politbureau. The thesis about the imperialist agents would be too dangerous in Poland where the Poznan events are closely known and it might have a result opposite to the intended one. On the other hand, the Russian party accepted for internal and international use the most simple and primitive thesis, the thesis which does not require a criticism of party policy in the period after Stalin's death. For if it is accepted that the Poznan events had some objective and right basis,

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or at least some element of right and justified demands of workers, the main thesis of the resolution of July 3rd, namely that after Stalin's death the party leadership was absolutely Leninist and that everything that can be subject to criticism is only a distant past of which there is no trace now, falls through.

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[redacted] in connection with this the Russian party may exert pressure on the Polish party in the direction of a uniform formulation of the causes of the Poznan events in accordance with the resolution of July 3rd. [redacted] 50X1-HUM it is necessary to follow up the inconsistencies between the Polish explanation of Poznan and the Russian formulation of the causes of Poznan in the resolution, and the inconsistencies between the Polish formulation of the causes of Poznan and the main idea of the Russian resolution that at present everything is good in the Soviet "Danish state."

In the article of TRYBUNA LUDU of July 11 there is one more significant and noteworthy fact. Namely, that the Russian resolution is not adjusted to the needs of Poland. There are no clear conclusions which follow from the Russian resolution for the party work in Poland, for the state activities in Poland and for the evaluation of the past in Poland. [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] this is a reflection of the fact that there is no uniform party stand on this matter and that the leader-

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ship seems to wait upon this matter till the program which

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should clarify the situation. This is also an additional proof how justified was the arrival of Bulganin in Warsaw for the holiday of July 22.

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